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The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), emerged in 2014 
from a faction of Al-Qaeda and captured portion of territories of 
Iraq and Syria. Since then, it has generated serious threats to the 
security of the United States and European, Asian, and Middle 
Eastern countries. In response, the threatened states have the 
right to use force in self-defense as guaranteed by Article 51 of the 
UN Charter. However, uncertainties arise related to the legality 
of the use of force against ISIS, because the stronger factions of 
this group are residing in Syrian territory and military 
operations by the U.S. against ISIS will imply the use of force 
within Syrian territory, which may constitute an infringement of 
its sovereignty. Nonetheless, the sovereignty of the Syrian state 
has already been violated when ISIS captured part of Syria. 
Furthermore, Syria has also failed to fulfill its responsibility to 
protect its citizens from grave human rights violations committed 
by ISIS. This leads to the possibility that the Syrian state might 
be unwilling or unable to counter and terminate the ISIS threat. 
Hence, this situation invites the application of the “unwilling or 
unable test” to justify the use of force against ISIS within Syrian 
territory; however, the legality of this consequence is arguable 
and uncertain. Furthermore, the UN Charter also does not 
provide guidance regarding an armed conflict between a non-
state actor, i.e., ISIS, and a state, i.e., the United States, within 
another state, i.e., in Syria. Therefore, if the threat is still 
overlooked by the UN or the international community, then there 
are chances that the threat-affected states may become involved 
in proxy wars for the protection of their security and interests. 
Keywords: Article 51, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), nonstate 
actors (NSA), self-defense, use of force, unwilling or unable test.  
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 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 40/61 of 
December 9, 1985, “[u]nequivocally condemns all acts, methods, 
and practices of terrorism wherever and by whoever committed 
including those which jeopardize friendly relations among states 
and their security.”1 However, there is confusion in international 
law concerning the use of force in response to an armed terrorist 
attack waged by a non-state actor against one state from the 
territory of another state. The terrorist assaults by ISIS on EU 
countries and other regions are the most recent examples of 
such an armed terrorist attack. ISIS occupied Mosul, border 
regions of Syria, and almost the entirety of northern Iraq in 
June 2014 and has developed a rudimentary governance system 
in the territories it has captured in the Levant.2 Its pursuit to 
gain control and use force is much more extreme than anything 
ever before exhibited by other jihadist groups, and it poses a 
major threat to regional as well as international peace and 
security.3  
 The UN Charter clearly recognizes the inherent right of 
states’ individual or collective self-defense. The right of self-
defense is inherent in natural law 4  and is limited by the 
customary principles of imminence, necessity, and 
proportionality. It is regulated by Article 51 of the Charter.5  
 However, if a state is attacked by non-state actors 
operating from another state, then this restricts the use of force 
in self-defense for the victim state until the other state fulfills 
its state responsibility. As per the principle of state 
responsibility, not only are all states required to protect their 
own citizens from human rights violations and atrocities of non-
state actors, but they are also under an obligation to ensure that 
no armed threat from their territory is launched by such non-
state actors against other states.6 
                                                             
1 G.A. Res. 40/61, ¶ 1 (Dec. 9, 1985). 
2 MALCOLM RUSSELL, THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA 163 (48th ed. 2014). 
3 ANDERS JÄGERSKOG & ASHOK SWAIN, EMERGING SECURITY THREATS IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST 23-24 (2016). 
4 DEREK W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 150-152 (1958); 
see also Anthony D’Amato, Israel’s Air Strike upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 
77 AM. J. INT’L L. 584-585, 584 (1983); see also: ADEMOLA ABASS, REGIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY 129 (2004). 
5  MURRAY C. ALDER, THE INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 (2013). 
6 Int’l Law Comm’n. Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/49, at 2 (2001), 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf. 
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 The United States launched airstrikes against al-Qaeda 
and ISIS targets in Syria but it is pertinent to mention that the 
US was never asked by the Syrian government to attack those 
non-state actors in its territory. As far as the airstrikes on Iraq 
are concerned, they are justified because the Iraqi government 
itself asked for military intervention to tackle the threat of non-
state actors in its territory. So the military operations in Syria 
were not legal because they lacked the consent of the Syrian 
government and were not even approved by the UN Security 
Council. 
 This Article argues that the unwilling or unable rationale 
does not fulfill the standard conditions of right of self-defense 
and concludes that said rationale is a new norm of jus ad bellum 
in the making and is the best option for the victim state in order 
to combat non-state actors.7 
 This Article will set out the complexities related to the 
legal frameworks for the use of force against non-state actors. In 
this regard, the first section of this Article will set out the threat 
posed by ISIS to the United States and, more particularly, 
Europe in the wake of recent terror attacks by ISIS in Paris and 
other EU cities. The inadequacy of international law in defining 
possible countermeasures to protect states from ISIS and 
similar terrorist groups will be discussed in the second section, 
along with the responsibilities applied by international law on 
every sovereign state. The third section includes an elaboration 
of humanitarian law, and the fourth section includes an 
explanation of the recently emerged “unwilling or unable test 
framework” and an application of it to ISIS. 
 
II. THE ISIS THREAT 
 
A. Emergence of ISIS 
 
In chaos-stricken Syria in 2014, Al-Qaeda’s rival jihadi 
group, ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), also called 
ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant),8 managed to 
capture a significant portion of territory in Syria and established 
a capital at al-Raqqah.9 The same year, in June, it occupied 
lands in Northern Iraq and Syria and, then, developed a 
                                                             
7 Hereinafter “non-state actor(s)” will shorthand referred to as NSA(s). 
8  JOHN MUELLER & MARK STEWART, CHASING GHOSTS: THE POLICING OF 
TERRORISM 45 (2016). 
9 CHARLES CARIS & SAMUEL REYNOLDS, INST. FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, MIDDLE 
E. SEC. REP. 22- ISIS GOVERNANCE IN SYRIA 4 (2014). 




makeshift rule in the territories it captured in the Levant 
region.10 The representativeness of this new “government” is a 
matter of immense debate, especially considering the fact that 
the group primarily uses force to gain territory. 
 ISIS operates under a doctrine of total war, often 
engaging in beheadings and gruesome murders. 11  In this 
context, it is morally and legally permissible for the 
international community to respond to the massive violations of 
human rights committed by ISIS. While the Iraqi government 
itself has sought help from the international community, 
external intervention in Syria seems quite problematic.12 The 
two main arguments that the proponents of intervention 
advance are based on the premise that action in Syria is 
necessary for the collective self-defense of Iraq, Syria, and the 
U.S. from the threats posed by ISIS.13 Furthermore, in contexts 
such as this, the “responsibility to protect” may be invoked to 
safeguard the citizens of Syria, Iraq, and connected Levant 
regions from facing violations of human rights. Since 2012, Syria 
has seen approximately 400,000 deaths,14 half of which have 
been in 2014, indicating the high magnitude of human rights 
violations that have occurred in this region in a very short 
tenure.15 The majority of these atrocities have allegedly been 
committed by ISIS, which in total has up to an estimated 30,000 
militants.16 
 With such a high number of trained and armed terrorists, 
ISIS is disseminating chaos and fear in the Levant region and 
challenging the very authority of the Iraqi and Syrian 
governments, and is planning to extend this fear toward 
                                                             
10 Islamic State and the Crisis in Iraq and Syria in Maps, BBC (Oct. 21, 
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034. 
11 JESSICA STERN & J. M. BERGER. ISIS: THE STATE OF TERROR (2015). 
12 HELEN DUFFY, THE ‘WAR ON TERROR' AND THE FRAMEWORK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 308 (2015). 
13 DAVID FRENCH, JAY SEKULOW, JORDAN SEKULOW, & ROBERT W. ASH, RISE 
OF ISIS: A THREAT WE CAN'T IGNORE (2014). 
14 John Hudson, U.N. Envoy Revises Syria Death Toll to 400,000, FOREIGN 
POLICY (Apr. 22, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/22/u-n-envoy-revises-
syria-death-toll-to-400000/. 
15 RAMESH THAKUR & WILLIAM MALEY, THEORISING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT, 169 (2015). 
16  HANS BINNENDIJK, FRIENDS, FOES, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS: U.S. 
PARTNERSHIPS IN A TURBULENT WORLD, 100-150 (Rand Corporation, 2016); 
see also Richard Norton, Up To 30,000 Foreign Fighters Have Gone to Syria 
and Iraq Since 2011 – Report, GUARDIAN (November 17, 2015), 
http://www.Theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/17/20000-foreign-fighters-syria-
-iraq-2014-terrorism-report. 
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America and European countries.17 It has claimed responsibility 
for the terror attacks in Paris,18 Istanbul, and Ankara,19 and at 
Brussels Airport,20  which took place in 2016 and caused the 
deaths of several innocent civilians. In addition to threatening 
non-Muslim states with hostile circumstances detrimental to 
their peace and security, it has also issued threats to Muslim21 
states who do not submit to ISIS’s ideology. 
  
B. Threat to International Peace and Security 
 
 As mentioned above, ISIS is a threat not just to Syria and 
Iraq (and their people) but also to the global community22 and 
thus armed intervention against ISIS in the Levant will simply 
be an exercise in self-defense. ISIS has issued threats related to 
launching direct attacks on the international community. ISIS 
leader Al-Adnani uploaded a video speech that included a direct 
threat: 
 
 O Americans, and O Europeans, the Islamic State 
did not initiate a war against you, as your governments 
and media try to make you believe.… You will pay the 
price when your economies collapse. You will pay the 
price when your sons are sent to wage war against us 
and they return to you as disabled amputees, or inside 
coffins, or mentally ill. You will pay the price as you are 
afraid of traveling to any land.… You will not feel secure 
even in your bedrooms. You will pay the price when this 
crusade of yours collapses, and thereafter we will strike 
you in your homeland, and you will never be able to 
harm anyone afterwards. You will pay the price, and we 
have prepared for you what will pain you.23 
 
In another instance, he directed his subordinates to launch 
attacks on European and American civilians as well as on other 
countries: 
                                                             
17 DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE AGE OF DEFERENCE 20 (2016). 
18  ERSEL AYDINLI, VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS: FROM ANARCHISTS TO 
JIHADISTS 145 (2016). 
19 DENIZ EROGLU, IBRAHIM SIRKECI, & JEFFREY COHEN, TURKISH MIGRATION 
2016 SELECTED PAPERS 280 (Eroglu et al. eds. 2016). 
20 DAVID ORLO, THE JERUSALEM PROTOCOL (2016). 
21 TAMARA SONN, ISLAM: HISTORY, RELIGION, AND POLITICS 178 (2016). 
22  French, supra note 13; see also Kinga Tibori-Szabó, The ‘Unwilling or 
Unable’ Test and the Law of Self-defense, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LAW 94 (Christophe Paulussen, Ben Van 
Rompuy, Tamara Takács, & Vesna Lazi eds., 2015). 
23 ROBERT SPENCER, THE COMPLETE INFIDEL'S GUIDE TO ISIS, Chpt. 2 (2015). 





 If you can kill a disbelieving American or European, 
especially the spiteful and filthy French, or an 
Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever from 
the disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the 
countries that entered into a coalition against the 
Islamic State [ISIS], then rely upon Allah, and kill him 
in any manner or way however it may be. Do not ask for 
anyone’s advice and do not seek anyone’s verdict. Kill the 
disbeliever whether he is civilian or military, for they 
have the same ruling. Both of them are disbelievers.… 
Both of their blood and wealth is legal for you to destroy, 
for blood does not become illegal or legal to spill by the 
clothes being worn.24 
 
In response to the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS, Al-Adnani re-
issued the warning to the United States by stating that it would 
be the last campaign of the United States because it would not 
survive after the campaign.25  He also threatened to raid the 
United States after the operation against ISIS: 
 
 [W]e will raid you thereafter, and you will never raid 
us.26 
 
These speeches point toward the direct threat that looms over 
the citizens of America, Europe, the Levant, and other countries, 
as is evident from the recent attacks by ISIS in Paris, Ankara, 
Istanbul, and other cities, which claimed the lives of many 
civilians, further indicating how deeply the ISIS threat has 
penetrated into European countries. 
 Furthermore, it is pertinent to mention here that ISIS 
spreads terror worldwide by using the internet, i.e., it uploads 
terrifying videos of its barbaric atrocities on public forums, e.g., 
YouTube, to terrorize the masses.27 It uploaded the videos of the 
beheadings of American journalists Steven Sotloff and James 
Foley in August and September 2014, the setting on fire and 
killing of Jordanian Air Force pilot Moath Kasasbeh, and the 
                                                             
24 HASSAN HASSAN & MICHAEL WEISS, ISIS: INSIDE THE ARMY OF TERROR 263 
(2016); see also BRIGITTE NACOS, TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM 28 
(2016); see also JOHN STAPLETON, TERROR IN AUSTRALIA: WORKERS' PARADISE 
LOST (2015). 
25 Id.; see also DAVID COOK, UNDERSTANDING JIHAD 241 (2015). 
26 Id. 
27 MAJEED KHADER, COMBATING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND RADICALIZATION IN 
THE DIGITAL ERA 34 (2016); see also MALCOLM NANCE, DEFEATING ISIS: WHO 
THEY ARE, HOW THEY FIGHT, WHAT THEY BELIEVE 384 (2016). 
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execution of Japanese journalist Kenji Goto,28 as well as the 
enslaving and selling of Iraqi children, the killings of Muslim 
scholars who refused to submit to ISIS leaders, the abduction 
and rape of girls in Syria and Iraq, and the killings of non-
Muslims and Shias in the Levant region after kidnapping and 
torturing them; yet these are only some of the instances of 
inhuman brutality of ISIS.29 ISIS also uses social networking 
websites including Twitter and Facebook to promote its specific 
hashtags for spreading terror. Such actions have terrified the 
global international community as the threats are not targeted 
to a specific country but to all of the international community.30 
 The question arises here is whether international law 
actually permits the use of force against an NSA, i.e., ISIS, 
within or near the territory of another sovereign state, i.e., 
Syria? A number of contemporary scholars and policymakers 
contend that, since the rules on the use of force in the United 
Nations Charter are inadequate to deal with today’s problems, 
particularly since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the use of force 
becomes necessary in certain instances as a self-defense 
mechanism.31 Nonetheless, it is a matter of fact that the U.S. 
and other countries can play an important role in preventing 
attacks from ISIS and in curbing the ISIS threat permanently 
by sharing intelligence and using force against ISIS as it will 
directly harm its power.32 Deeming this to be anticipatory and 
preventive self-defense and working in response, the U.S. and 
some other EU countries including Turkey, France, the U.K., 
and Russia have started launching counterattacks on ISIS in 
the Syrian border regions.33 However, the counterattacks have 
not diminished the threat posed by ISIS,34 probably because of 
the fact that the counterattacks are not as forceful as they ought 
to be or perhaps owing to the restrictions and limitations from 
                                                             
28 SHAKIRA HUSSEIN, FROM VICTIMS TO SUSPECTS: MUSLIM WOMEN SINCE 9/11 
(2016); see also SAMI MOUBAYED, UNDER THE BLACK FLAG: AT THE FRONTIER 
OF THE NEW JIHAD 137 (2015). 
29 Eliza Griswold, Is This the End of Christianity in The Middle East?, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 22, 2015). 
30  MARK WHEELER & PETROS IOSIFIDIS, PUBLIC SPHERES AND MEDIATED 
SOCIAL NETWORKS IN THE WESTERN CONTEXT AND BEYOND 273 (2016). 
31 Samantha Arrington Sliney, Right to Act: United States Legal Basis Under 
the Law of Armed Conflict to Pursue the Islamic State in Syria, 6 U. MIAMI 
NAT’L SEC. & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. 1, 2-3, 23 (2015). 
32 ARNOLD SCHUCHTER, ISIS CONTAINMENT & DEFEAT (2015). 
33 THAKUR, supra note 15, 169. 
34 HABIB TILIOUINE, THE STATE OF SOCIAL PROGRESS OF ISLAMIC SOCIETIES: 
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGES 199 (Richard 
Estes ed., 2016). 




international law in approving and endorsing such 
counterattacks.35 Therefore, this paper will look to explore and 
explain the justifications for the use of force against ISIS in the 
Levant region, particularly in Syria. 
 
III. ARMED ATTACK AND THE USE OF FORCE 
 
A. Armed Attack 
 
 In order to evaluate whether the threats and terrorist 
attacks from ISIS qualify as an armed attack, we will first 
clarify the definition of an armed attack. In this regard, 
Resolutions 1368 and 1373, which were passed by the United 
Nations Security Council in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks, define 
armed attack in following words: 
 
 [The] large-scale attacks by non-state actors can 
qualify as “armed attacks” within the meaning of Article 
51.36 
 
In this context, the threats from ISIS against the United States 
and other countries can be considered threats of armed attacks. 
Furthermore, the recent terrorist attacks conducted by ISIS in 
European countries can actually be regarded as large-scale 
attacks, because they resulted in the killings of significant 
numbers of people and caused huge financial losses to the 
damaged and attacked areas. 37  Therefore, such large-scale 
armed attacks are paving the way toward a perpetual armed 
conflict between ISIS NSAs and the states of Europe and 
America. 
 The aforementioned resolutions of the United Nations 
also endorse the rights to use force to respond to such armed 
attacks. In this regard, Resolution 1368 further endorses the 
targeted use of force against any entity—whether a state or non-
state group—involved in promoting or harboring the armed 
                                                             
35 JULIAN RUDOLPH & KYLE HACKEL, POLITIGUIDE 2016: UNDERSTAND THE 
ISSUES, STAY INFORMED, JOIN THE DISCUSSION, EMPOWER YOURSELF 63 
(2016). 
36 See S. C. Res. 1368 (Sep. 12, 2001); see also MICHAEL SCHARF, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 209 (2013); see also 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 374 (Pierre 
Hauck & Sven Peterke eds., 2016). 
37  ANDREW FIALA & BARBARA MACKINNON, ETHICS: THEORY AND 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 529 (2016). 
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attacks.38 A military operation against the involved characters 
would be recognized as an act of self-defense by the victim state 
for countering the terrorist threat. 39  However, this does not 
imply that the UN Resolutions 1368 and 1373 endorse unilateral 
attacks by one state against a group of NSAs residing within the 
territory of another state. 40  Furthermore, nothing in these 
resolutions suggests that a unilaterally decided action of use of 
force by a state would be recognized as a universally acceptable 
and legitimate action; 41  there have been examples in recent 
history in which the use of force by a state against an NSA in 
the territory of another state was not approved by the United 
Nations Security Council. For instance, the use of force by Israel 
in Syrian territory in 2003 to destroy a Palestinian armed 
group’s training center was denounced by the UN Security 
Council despite the fact that Israel presented a self-defense 
argument against that armed group. 42  This indicates that a 
state has to take into consideration the international bodies, 
among which the United Nations Security Council is the most 
esteemed, whose endorsement of the “use of force” against a 
state or NSAs will be considered universally acceptable and 
legally approved. This has become a norm in customary 
international law for justifying the use of force against another 
state or against an NSA in another state.43 The attack against 
Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001 is an application of this 
norm.44 
 On the other hand, it is pertinent to mention, here, that 
many scholars argue that the use of force in self-defense 
pursuant to Article 51 does not require the approval of the 
Security Council. Rather, as scholars further argue, states can 
use their inherent right to self-defense without the approval of 
any international body, including the UN Security Council, 
because there is nothing in the language of Article 51 that 
requires states to gain approval from any international body 
prior to exercising their right of self-defense. 45  As the 
                                                             
38 Id. 
39 KIMBERLEY TRAPP, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
59 (2011). 
40 COUNTER-TERRORISM AND THE POST-DEMOCRATIC STATE 122 (Colleen Lewis 
& Jenny Hocking eds., 2007) [hereinafter COUNTER-TERRORISM]. 
41 Id. 
42 TRAPP, supra note 39, at 58. 
43  AFRICA AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 92 (Dan Kuwali & Frans 
Viljoen eds., 2013). 
44 Id.; see also NIGEL WHITE, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL 
CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 41 (2014). 
45 YASSIN EL-AYOUTY, PERSPECTIVES ON 9/11 57 (2004). 




International Court of Justice (ICJ) noted in the Nicaragua 
case:46 
 
 There is nothing in the language of the Article 51 
that prevents the victim state from exercising its inherent 
right to self-defence.47 
 
Hence, if a victim state wants to unilaterally exercise its right to 
self-defense by waging a military operation against NSAs 
residing in another state that may or may not sponsor the NSA, 
then the use of force against the NSA by the victim state should 
be recognized as in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter 
and therefore regarded as a legitimate action.48 
 However, despite this provision, the UN Security Council 
intervenes in order to evaluate the legitimacy of any unilateral 
attack waged by a victim state against another state. This is 
done in order to prevent any victim state from becoming an 
aggressor, because the UN Charter does not allow any state to 
act in a similar manner. Therefore, gaining approval from the 
UN Security Council for the use of force acts as a criterion for 
legitimizing the use of force, in addition to Article 51 of the UN 
Charter and on the basis of self-defense.49 While adhering to the 
aforementioned normative practice, a state can use force against 
another state that is harboring terrorism or against the NSAs 
that have gained control over an independent or sovereign 
territory, if the use of force is in accordance with exercising the 
inherent right of self-defense.50 
 
B. The Use of Force in International Law 
 
1. Uncertainty in International Law 
 
 International law does not give clear guidance on the 
recommended and suitable action in a situation of armed conflict 
between a state and a non-state group residing in another 
state’s territory. This makes it challenging to adjudicate 
whether the use of force in self-defense by state X against a non-
                                                             
46  LARISSA VAN DEN HERIK & NICO SCHRIJVER, COUNTER-TERRORISM 
STRATEGIES IN A FRAGMENTED INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 288 (2015). 
47  See TOM RUYS, ARMED ATTACK AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER: 
EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE, 484 (2010); see also ANNYSSA 
BELLAL, THE WAR REPORT: ARMED CONFLICT IN 2014 402 (2016). 
48 Id. 
49 AFRICA AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 43, at 92. 
50 BELINDA HELMKE, UNDER ATTACK 44 (2016). 
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state group residing in state Y is legally justifiable. As a result, 
we also need to identify if state Y is a weak or failed state that 
cannot control the NSAs from their violent activities or if state Y 
is sponsoring the NSA against state X. Should force be used 
within the territorial limits of state Y or should it be kept at its 
borders to maintain the sovereignty of that state? These aspects 
need to be evaluated for consolidating arguments in favor of the 
use of force against an NSA in state Y. 
 As a result, though Article 5151 approves a victim state’s 
use of force in self-defense, it does not provide guidance on the 
use of force against NSAs residing in a state that has no 
intention of causing harm to the victim state. If a group of NSAs 
launches terrorist activities from the territory of one state 
against another and the NSA is not connected politically with 
the host state, then there is no provision of the UN Charter that 
could provide guidance on the using force against the NSA 
within the territory of another state. On the other hand, another 
scholarly position argues that since Article 51 approves the use 
of force as a mechanism of self-defense, then force can be used 
against any entity, including an NSA, that may threaten the 
security of a state.52 
 The main contention is that if international law or the 
UN Security Council permits using force against the NSA 
residing or using the territory of a state that is also against the 
NSA, then the use of force or a military operation against the 
NSA within the territory of the host state53 can infringe the 
sovereignty of the host state. However, we must also consider 
the fact that the sovereignty of the host state has already been 
violated when the NSA captured some of the territory of that 
state and launched terrorist activities from there against the 
victim state. In such an instance, it is the inherent right of the 
victim state to protect itself from the attacks waged on it from 
the host state territory;54 for this purpose of self-defense, the 
victim state can also use arms against attack from the host state 
territory. 
 Thus, in such an instance, we can infer that clearly the 
use of force in self-defense by the victim state against NSAs in 
another state can stand in accordance with Article 51 and thus 
the action would be regarded as legitimate. The only contention 
                                                             
51 U.N. Charter art. 51, ¶ 8 (1945). 
52  Evan Criddle & William Banks, Customary Constraints on The Use of 
Force: Article 51 With an American Accent, 7 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 29 (2015). 
53 The “host state” is the state where the NSA resides or from where the NSA 
is launching terrorist attacks against the victim state. 
54 U.N. Charter art. 51, ¶ 9. 




is the apparent violation of the sovereignty of the host state. 
This makes it difficult to pronounce either state the “victim 
state,” since one state is the victim of terrorist threats or attacks 
from the NSA, while the second state can become the victim of 
the use of force by the first in response to the attacks and 
threats from the NSA. 
 On the other hand, if the host state does not have the 
capacity to counter the threats of the NSA, then that state may 
be regarded as a “weak” state. Furthermore, if such a state is 
unable to firmly maintain and implement the obligations of the 
international treaties within its territory and is unable to secure 
its territory from being captured by NSAs, then the weak state 
can be declared a “failed” state.55 
 Furthermore, a political or institutional vacuum there can 
lead to the involuntary collapse of that state and, consequently, 
can make it a safe haven for the NSA to launch more attacks on 
the victim state.56 To counter such a possibility, and to defend 
itself from such attacks, we can infer that the victim state 
should use force against the NSA within the territory that may 
originally have been part of the weak or failed state but is now 
controlled by the NSA. In this regard, the aforementioned 
situation cannot be regarded as equivalent to when the host 
state has the ability to regain control of its lost territory from 
the NSA as in that situation the host state cannot be regarded 
as a weak or failed state. However, the UN Charter does not 
provide any explanation or recommendation of a 
countermeasure for a situation where the host state is 
overlooking the existence of the NSA and is neglecting the 
threat posed by the NSA to another state or if it is also reluctant 
or unwilling to take severe action against the NSA. 
 
2. The Use of Force and Self-Defense 
 
 Such an act of using force in order to preserve self-defense 
can be explained in the following lines, as stated by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ):57 
 
The right of self-defence is a right to use force to avert an 
attack. The source of the attack, whether a State or a 
                                                             
55 DAMIEN KINGSBURY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 169 (2007). 
56 Id. 
57 LOUISE ARIMATSU, MICHAEL SCHMITT, & TIM MCCORMACK, YEARBOOK OF 
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non-state actor, is irrelevant to the existence of the 
right.58 
 
Consequently, force can also be used within the territory of the 
host state where the NSA is safely residing in and controlling a 
portion of territory. The host state would be targeted if it is 
neither willing nor able to take serious action against the NSA, 
because an unwilling state is considered to be cooperating with 
the NSA, whereas the inability of the host state brands it a 
failed state that can disrupt international peace by becoming a 
safe haven for terrorists. In this regard, force, i.e., the military 
operations, against such rogue states or against the NSA must 
not harm the general population in that state. 
 
3. Individual and Collective Self-Defense 
 
 The Preamble to the UN Charter demonstrates its resolve 
to uphold fundamental human rights. 59  The International 
Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil 
and Political Rights, along with the International Bill of Rights, 
encompass contemporary principles of human rights. These are 
supplemented by regional treaties and conventions, such as the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 1950.60 Human rights 
lawyers in the recent past have increasingly tried to enforce 
human rights laws on armed action, although traditionally 
international humanitarian law has been used to limit the 
excesses of war. 
 In addition to customary law on self-defense, Article 51 of 
the UN Charter is the most important provision that endorses 
individual as well as collective self-defense.61 It grants modern 
states the right to respond with force to any breach of their 
security. 62  The right to self-defense can be invoked both in 
response to an actual armed attack and also in retaliation to the 
threat of an imminent attack63—the latter is referred to as 
anticipatory self-defense. 
                                                             
58  WILLIAM C. BANKS, COUNTERINSURGENCY LAW: NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
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LAW 317 (2002). 
62 U.N. Charter art. 5. 
63 Christian Tams, The Use of Force against Terrorists, 20:2 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
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 More significantly, states have the right to collective self-
defense, which is “the sum of individual rights to self-defense in 
a scenario where threats to a state’s security are linked to those 
of another.” 64  Collective self-defense can be exercised in a 
scenario where a “proximate relationship” exists between the 
self-defense of two or more entities.65 Collective security is one of 
the fundamental principles66 upon which the UN Charter rests 
its prohibition of force and its encouragement of the peaceful 
settlement of disputes.67 Enforcement operations involving the 
use of force can be authorized by the Security Council to target a 
specific state or entity. 68  These entities may range from a 
government to an armed group that possesses territory. 
 
IV. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
 
 The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a doctrine that 
implies that states have the essential responsibility to protect 
their population from every kind of threats, whether cross-
border invasion or intra-state conflict.69 The underlying purpose 
is to assure peace and security to the general population; 
however, if the state fails to do so owing to its inability or 
unwillingness to protect the public, then the responsibility falls 
to the international community to be responsible for protecting 
the population of that state.70 This doctrine was presented by 
the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001.71 
 Furthermore, R2P also endorses humanitarian 
intervention in a situation where the citizens of a state are 
facing violations of human rights and the state is unable or 
unwilling to eliminate harm to the citizens. 72  In such a 
                                                             
64 GABRIELA MARIA KUTTING, CONVENTIONS, TREATIES AND OTHER RESPONSES 
TO GLOBAL ISSUES 40 (2009). 
65 See Tams, supra note 63. 
66 CHIE KOJIMA & RUDIGER WOLFRUM, SOLIDARITY: A STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLE 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 174 (2010); see also: KUTTING, supra note 64, at 40. 
67  ANN KARIN LARSSEN & DAG HENRIKSEN, POLITICAL RATIONALE AND 
INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR IN LIBYA 248 (2016). 
68 Id. 
69 JOHN DAVIS, THE ARAB SPRING AND ARAB THAW 61-86 (2016). 
70 DUBRAVKA ZARKOV & HELEN HINTJENS, CONFLICT, PEACE, SECURITY AND 
DEVELOPMENT: THEORIES AND METHODOLOGIES 238 (2014). 
71  Id.; see also DANIEL SILANDER & DON WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT: THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN SYRIA 19 (2015). 
72  GUNTHER HELLMANN, JUSTICE AND PEACE 29 (2013); see also INGRID 
DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 110 (2016). 
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situation, R2P assigns responsibility to other states and 
international organizations to violate the sovereignty of the 
unable or unwilling state in order to protect the civilians from 
facing human rights violations and further harm.73 
 In this section of the paper, we will analyze the legality of 
the R2P doctrine and the reactionary stance of the international 
community to the application of R2P, as some scholars largely 
accept it, while others apply limits to it. 
 
A. Strong R2P 
 
 The R2P doctrine is regarded as “Strong R2P” when 
states consider it without seeking approval from the UN 
Security Council to use force within the territory of a state that 
is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens from harm. The fact 
that the approval from the UNSC is not required is actually 
based on the consequence when one or more members of the 
Security Council vetoes the use of force against a state and the 
Security Council is unable to decide or approve the legitimacy of 
the use of force.74 Therefore, to avert such a dependency, the 
Strong R2P notion is suggested. Such an action has been 
exercised by states by using the collective self-defense or 
collective humanitarian interventions procedures.75 
 
B. Limited R2P 
 
 After the instigation of Strong R2P, many states and 
scholars opposed it, leading to the adoption of the Limited R2P 
notion. This concept rejects any use of force by states without 
the approval of the Security Council.76 Moreover, it also requires 
states to present first the legal, pragmatic, and authentic 
justification for force within a state. 77  Furthermore, it also 
applies limits to the categories of harm that may be regarded to 
invoke R2P. 
 
C. Norms of the R2P Doctrine 
 
                                                             
73 See ZARKOV & HINTJENS, supra note 70; see also DETTER, supra note 72, at 
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 In addition to the formation of the Strong and Limited 
R2P doctrines, there are two norms found within the R2P 





1. Prescriptive Norm 
 
 This norm within the R2P framework urges states to use 
force within a state where the civilians are facing human rights 
violations,78 and actually approves intervention as obligatory in 
this situation.79 The word “prescriptive” has been used for this 
norm because it actually associates the use of force as a 
prescription for human rights violations in a state that has 
failed to protect its citizens from harm.80 
 
2. Permissive Norm 
 
 This norm is related to the permission to use force within 
the territory of a state to protect its citizens from human rights 
violations. This norm makes it mandatory for states to get 
approval from the UN Security Council.81 This norm is related to 
the Limited R2P doctrine and it is favored by most states and 
scholars. Although this norm approves the importance of 
collective intervention within the territory of a state where 
civilians are facing human rights violations, it suggests that the 
use of force or military operations should be the last option and 
other peaceful options ought to be attempted before applying 
it.82 This norm was also endorsed by former Secretary-General 
of the UN Kofi Annan in the 2005 World Summit.83 
 The international community has largely favored and 
accepted the Limited R2P and Permissive norm instead of 
                                                             
78  ADEMOLA ABASS, COMPLETE INTERNATIONAL LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND 
MATERIALS 409 (2014). 
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80 Jonah Eaton, An Emerging Norm - Determining the Meaning and Legal 
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81  DAN KUWALI, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF 
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endorsing the Strong R2P and Prescriptive norm.84 Therefore, to 
use force within the territory of a state for a just cause, 
permission has to be given by the UN Security Council in order 
to satisfy the permissive norm of R2P.85 
 
D. Responsibilities of a Sovereign State 
 
 The idea of sovereign responsibilities was universally 
accepted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
194886 and it has much in common with R2P.87 The sovereign 
responsibilities idea implies that every state has the 
responsibility to protect its population from human rights 
violations, ethnic conflicts and cleansing, and severe crimes.88 
Moreover, it is also an essential responsibility of states to 
protect their population’s freedom and fundamental human 
rights.89 
 The International Law Commission added more 
implications to the notions of sovereign responsibilities and 
published the additions with the new title of “Responsibility of 
States.”90 According to the International Law Commission, the 
concept of state responsibility implies that a state is responsible 
for the actions, and their consequences, of every individual or 
group residing within its territory and acting on its behalf of or 
with its support. 91  This implies that a state will be held 
responsible for terrorist attacks that NSAs launch from its 
territory against another sovereign state, if it is sponsoring their 
activities. Moreover, if the state is harboring terrorism it will be, 
in fact, a violator of the sovereignty of the victim state against 
which the terrorists are launching attacks. Therefore, the victim 
state has the inherent right to use force in self-defense to 
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counter such a threat92 and force is justifiable and in accordance 
with international law.93 
 However, the situation becomes complicated when the 
state is not harboring terrorism and the NSAs are acting 
independently to cause harm to another state. There are two 
alternatives here. The first is that the state is willing and able 
to dismantle the terrorist activities of the NSAs residing in its 
territory; the second is that the state is willing but unable to do 
so. In both situations, it is the explicit responsibility of the state 
to take effective measures to eliminate the terrorist threats from 
its territory. Let us consider the situation in Syria as an 
illustration of the responsibility of the state and the use of force. 
We can apply these two situations to Syria. 
 Here, in the first alternative, i.e., if the Syrian state has 
the ability to counter the terrorist activities, then it must use 
force by launching military operations against ISIS NSAs within 
its territorial limits and borders, and it must ensure that its 
steps are concrete enough to override the threats from ISIS. In 
such an event, the use of force by the victim state, i.e., the 
United States and EU countries, on the basis of self-defense is 
not required because the host state, i.e., the Syrian government, 
would already be acting on behalf of the victim state in self-
defense. However, unfortunately, this is not the reality as the 
Syrian government has not cooperated with the United States, 
or with other states that have been victims of ISIS. Although the 
Syrian government has repeatedly confirmed that it wants to 
eliminate the threat of ISIS from the region, it has not been able 
to do so.94 
 This leads to the second alternative, i.e., if the Syrian 
state is unable to control its territory from being used by ISIS, 
then this creates a difficult situation that makes it tricky to 
authorize the use of force against it. Some scholars even argue 
that it is unreasonable to declare a state responsible for terrorist 
actions that it is neither doing nor aiding;95 therefore, launching 
an attack against that state would be deemed an attack against 
the sovereignty of that state. 
 Furthermore, the actual situation here is that the 
territory of that state, i.e., Syria, is exploited by the NSA for 
launching terrorist attacks against another state, and therefore 
                                                             
92 See DOUGLAS LOVELACE & KRISTEN BOON, TERROR-BASED INTERROGATION 
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this suggests that the sovereignty of that state has already been 
infringed by the NSA. 96  Here, again, the question arises: 
whether the Syrian state—which is unable in terms of economic 
or weaponry infrastructure to counter the NSA—should be 
considered responsible for the attacks. 97  The questions arise 
here are what action would be recommended for the victim state 
for its self-defense? Should it use force against the state from 
which the terrorist attacks were launched? Will it violate the 
sovereignty of the host state in a manner that constitutes a 
violation of the international legal obligations and what 
responsibility applies on the host state, i.e., Syria? 
 In such an event, the International Law Commission 
describes the responsibility of states as: 
 
 The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be 
considered an act of a State under international law if 
the person or group of persons is in fact exercising 
elements of the governmental authority in the absence or 
default of the official authorities and in circumstances 
such as to call for the exercise of those elements of 
authority.98 
 
 This argument is relatable to the situation in Syria and 
the Levant region, where ISIS has captured some territories of 
Iraq and Syria and subsequently is exercising authoritative 
control over these territories.99 ISIS has posed as a threat not 
only to the neighboring state of Iraq, but also to the United 
States and to European countries,100 where it has also launched 
terrorist attacks. 101  The details of the threat from ISIS are 
mentioned in the first section of this paper. These threats and 
the authoritative control of ISIS in the Levant region, 
accompanied by the denial by the Syrian government under 
President Bashar Al-Assad of launching attacks on ISIS, creates 
a situation in which Article 9 of the Responsibility of States 
draft is fully applicable because the Syrian government has not 
performed effective measures to eliminate the ISIS threat to 
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other states, probably because it is unable to do so. Therefore, 
the Syrian government has fulfilled neither its state 
responsibility nor the international obligations to curb the 
terrorist havens.102 Furthermore, the apparent neglect by the 
Syrian Government regarding the activities of ISIS has 
facilitated ISIS in terms of spreading its militancy and 
stronghold in the Levant region; hence, the neglect has occurred 
as an indirect sponsoring of ISIS. Therefore, in accordance with 
the principles of state responsibility, the Syrian state’s 
government shares the responsibility for the terrorist attacks 
that are organized, planned, and launched by ISIS from Syrian 
territory against Syrian,103 Iraqi, and European citizens and for 
threats that are generated by ISIS to the United States. 
 Thus, an implication can be inferred that necessitates the 
use of force by the victim state in the territory of the state that 
is unable to control the NSA in its territory because that state 
has already failed to comply with international obligations to 
prohibit terrorist organizations to take hold of its territory. 
Additionally, as sovereignty of the host state has already been 
violated by the NSA by taking hold of some territory of host 
state, it further suggests that, if a robust military operation is 
not launched against the NSA, then the NSA may penetrate 
further into the territory of that state to take control of more 
territory in that state. This would be harmful not only for the 
unity of the host state but also for the self-defense of the victim 
state. Therefore, the use of force would be justifiable and 
legitimate against the NSA in that state to destroy the NSAs’ 
stronghold, whether the relevant military operation may harm 
the government, administration, or dominion of the host state 
within its territory.104 
 Thus, the eventual response from the victim state would 
be to use its inherent right of self-defense to approve the use of 
force to counter the attacks of NSAs because the host state is not 
cooperating or does not have the capacity to cooperate effectively 
with the victim state.105 As a consequence, here, the principle of 
state responsibility, which prevents a state from violating the 
territory of another state is naturally and legitimately 
overshadowed and superseded by the principle of self-defense. 
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 If a state fails to fulfill its responsibilities, then it would 
be considered to have failed to protect its citizens or to have 
been involved in the human rights violations. This implies that, 
if a state is assisted or attacked by the international community 
for the purpose of safeguarding the basic human rights of its 
population and protecting the population from atrocities 
committed in the territory either by that state or by some NSAs, 
then the sovereign responsibilities would appear to be upheld. 
Therefore, sovereignty is neither desecrated nor vandalized.106 
 Scholars tend to agree that the protection of citizens’ 
fundamental human rights is of higher importance than 
respecting the state’s sovereignty, and if that state is involved in 
violating human rights then that state is not fulfilling its 
sovereign responsibilities. Therefore, its sovereignty should not 
be considered equivalent to the sovereignty of other states.107 
Therefore, force can be used to protect that state’s citizens from 
harm to their fundamental human rights.108 In order to further 
evaluate the legality and pragmatism associated with the use of 
force against a state within its territory, we can apply the 
“unwilling or unable test.” 
 
V. THE UNWILLING OR UNABLE TEST FRAMEWORK 
 
 The unwilling or unable test framework was presented by 
Ashley Deeks in 2012 to assess the use of force in relation to the 
willingness or ability of the host state to counter the threat of an 
NSA.109 We have already discussed two situations, in which the 
host state was either willing and able to conduct strikes against 
NSAs or willing but unable to do so. Now we will evaluate the 
situation when the host state is unwilling and unable to punish 
the terrorist NSAs. 
 When a state is unwilling or unable to prevent violations 
of human rights in its territory and does not protect its citizens, 
or when it is either unwilling or unable to break down the safe 
havens of NSAs that are launching terrorist attacks against 
another state, then the “unable or unwilling test” provides a 
pragmatic framework for justifying the use of force within the 
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territory of the unwilling state against NSAs.110 Furthermore, as 
mentioned in earlier sections, the state that harbors terrorist 
NSAs can be dealt with by force by victim states; therefore, if a 
state is unwilling to counter NSA threats, then it can be 
conceived as harboring the NSA. 
 
A. Steps for Implementation of the Unwilling or 
Unable Test 
 
 In order to devise a pragmatic framework to punish the 
state that is unwilling or unable to launch attacks against the 
NSA, we will analyze the following steps for implementing the 
unwilling or unable test framework, which contains some 
guidelines and rules for the use of force.111 
 
1. Consent or Collaboration 
 
 The first step of implementing the “unwilling or unable 
test” is to acquire permission from the host state to use force 
within its territorial grounds against the NSA.112 If permission 
is granted by the host state, then the issue is resolved and there 
is no need for the next steps of the test. On the other hand, if 
permission is not granted, then the victim state can request that 
the host state take collaborative action against the NSA in the 
form of launching joint military operations against the NSA, 
which would be followed according to guidelines provided by the 
host state and the unable or unwilling test. 113  Such a 
collaborative operation against the NSA would safeguard the 
sovereignty of the host state and would adhere to the demands 
of the victim state to preserve its right of self-defense. 
Furthermore, such an operation would also carry a joint military 
cooperation and a joint information sharing mechanism between 
the states against the NSA,114 which would ensure availability 
of effective information of the NSA’s safe havens, allowing both 
states to destroy the safe havens permanently. 
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2. Evaluation of Threat 
 
 It is also essential to estimate the extent of the threat, 
i.e., assessing the strength of the NSA, 115  the number and 
variety of weapons possessed by the NSA, the quantity of 
resources owned or captured by the NSA, the number of the 
NSA’s armed men, etc., as well as evaluating the geographical 
terrain of the conflict, the atmospheric or climatic conditions 
that may act as factors of advantage for the NSA, and the 
strength of the army and weaponry infrastructure of the host 
state. These are some of the aspects that are necessary for a 
victim state to consider prior to launching any attack against 
the NSA with or without the collaboration of the host state.116 
This is because the more influential the climatic and 
geographical situations in the region and the more substantive 
ownership of sophisticated weapons of the NSA, the more 
challenging it would be for the victim state to conclusively 
launch a military operation against the NSA in the territorial 
grounds of the host state, while also ensuring that no significant 
harm is done to the civilians of the host state during the launch 
of the operation. 
 In this regard, a collaborative joint operation would prove 
to be more effective because the host state would be providing 
guidelines and sharing information with the victim state to face 
the geographical, climatic, and other innate factors of the region 
properly, as well as to avoid populated regions to prevent 
casualties of local civilians.117 
 
3. Request to the Host State 
 
 The victim state can also request that the host state 
unilaterally take action against the NSA in its territory.118 Such 
a request can be made by the victim state in a situation where 
the host state rejects the request for a joint military operation 
against the NSA and does not grant permission for the victim 
state to use force against the NSA unilaterally; this would 
indicate the relevant unwillingness or inability of the host state 
to counter the threat posed by the NSA to the victim state.119 If 
the host state accepts the request from the victim state to carry 
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out the operation against the NSA on its own, then it will 
preserve its territorial sovereignty as well as eliminate the 
threats of the NSA. 120  Moreover, such a situation would be 
beneficial for the continuation of friendly bilateral relations 
between the victim and host state. 
 On the other hand, if the host state again rejects the 
request of the victim state to launch operation against the NSA, 
then such a noncooperative stance would be taken by the 
international community as an indication that the host state is 
harboring terrorist NSAs within its territory. Furthermore, the 
victim state should also give the host state a reasonable amount 
of time to decide about the request of the victim state to use 
force within the host state’s territory against the NSA.121 If this 
is done, the request from the victim state to use force against 
the NSA within the host state’s territorial limits would be 
considered justified and legitimate. 
 
4. Evaluation of the Host State’s Capability 
 
 It is also essential for the victim state to analyze the 
capabilities of the host state in measuring and countering the 
threats posed by the NSA.122  In this regard, the capabilities 
should be judged in both situations, i.e., when the host state has 
agreed to a joint military operation against the NSA and when it 
has adopted the stance to counter the threat unilaterally. In 
both situations, the victim state needs to consider whether the 
host state has the adequate military capacity in terms of 
sophisticated weaponry infrastructure and adequately trained 
military to counter the threat from the NSA effectively. If the 
capacity is lacking, then the victim state can provide assistance 
to the host state in meeting the deficiencies in countering the 
NSA threat. 
 In most situations, the host state may not reveal its 
military incapacities openly because doing so would tarnish the 
international reputation of their military strength. In such a 
circumstance, the victim state would need to collect accurate 
information about the military capabilities of the host state in 
countering the NSA threat on its own and then choose either to 
convince the host state to let the victim state join the operation 
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against the NSA or to launch it unilaterally according to its own 
military planning and weaponry capacities.123 
 
5. Anticipation of Means to Use Force 
 
 Prior to launching any military operation against the 
NSA for self-defense, the victim state needs to first evaluate and 
finalize the arrangements, i.e., the adequate means to counter 
the threat.124 In this regard, the victim state must choose the 
means to use force reasonably and justifiably so that its actions 
will not be regarded as aggressions on the soil of the host 
state.125 To gain the support of the international community for 
its decision to use force, the victim state can also share its 
proposed means to counter the NSA threat with the world by 
either publicly announcing them in a codified manner or 
through diplomatic channels. 126  For instance, some of the 
anticipated means might be by targeted aerial bombardments on 
terrorist safe havens or by conducting ground operations to 
track down terrorists and capture them alive to interrogate 
them about the source of their financial and weaponry support. 
 
6. Consideration of Former Interactions 
 
 The victim state’s former interactions with the host state 
also play an important role in finalizing arrangements for 
cooperation between the victim state and the host state.127 That 
is, if there has been a history of hostility between the host state 
and the victim state, which has caused hostile interactions in 
the past, then the chances of cooperation between the two states 
are slight. 
 In contrast, a common history of collaborative interactions 
will most probably facilitate effective cooperation for joint 
information sharing and launching joint use of force against the 
NSA in the territory of the host state. Therefore, the victim state 
needs to consider the historical interactions before making a 
request to the host state for use of force in its territory;128 that 
is, the victim state needs to utilize more diplomatic channels, 
i.e., bilateral peaceful dialogues or interactions of the leaders of 
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both states on international public forums or at bilateral public 
events to initiate a cordial atmosphere between the two states, 
and then, eventually, convince the host state to agree to the use 
of force against the NSA in its territory. This would neutralize 
the effects of past hostile interactions between the two states 
and would urge them to cooperate and act mutually against the 
NSA. 
 On the other hand, in the aftermath of failure of 
utilization of diplomatic efforts, the victim state can publicly 
make requests to the host state to either use force unilaterally 
or accept the request for a joint operation in collaboration with 
the victim state against the NSA. If the host state agrees to 
neither request, then the victim state can get support from the 
international community regarding its stance to use force 
against the NSA for self-defense in the light of the unwilling or 
unable position shown by the host state to cooperate with the 
victim state.129 The eventual international support will endorse 
the use of force against the NSA as legitimate.130 
 These six steps of the unwilling or unable test enable the 
victim state to use force in a reasonable and justified manner. 
Moreover, these steps also urge the host state to decide 
pragmatically to take up arms against the NSA within its own 
territory and set out the criteria to judge the unwillingness or 
inability of the host state to counter the NSA threat. These steps 
also discourage the victim state from using force unilaterally 
without acquiring permission from the host state or without the 
support of the international community. Owing to their 
pragmatic, justified, and rationale approach, these steps have 
been molded into a single framework for the implementation of 
the unable or unwilling test in an armed conflict between a 
victim state and NSAs. 
 
B. Historical Roots of the Test 
 
 The historical roots of the unwilling or unable test can be 
found in the law of neutrality, which is considered a universally 
established principle. 131  The law of neutrality was first 
introduced in 1907 in the Hague Convention in order to create a 
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framework for states to remain neutral in a regional or 
international armed conflict. 132  This law has become an 
essential component of customary international law,133 and it is 
also included in the military guidelines and rules of Belgium, 
Switzerland, Canada, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom. 134  Under this law, for a state to stay neutral, its 
territorial grounds must not facilitate a regional or international 
armed conflict. 135  To explain this, we can assert that the 
territory of the neutral state must not be used for such armed 
activities that may promote or demote the armed conflict in any 
manner, i.e., the territory must not allow the transportation of 
weapons or armed men of any party to the conflict, and must not 
facilitate or allow any party to launch attacks from its territory 
or from the border of its territory against any party to the 
conflict.136  
 It is pertinent to mention here that the neutrality 
principle inherent in the neutrality law urges the neutral state 
to take strict action if any party, notably a NSA, crosses into its 
territory and attempts to use its territory to launch armed 
attacks against a party to the conflict.137 In such an event, if the 
neutral state does not prevent, say, NSAs to launch an attack 
against, say, a victim state, then the neutrality of the state 
would be suspected to be biased and favoring the NSAs over the 
victim state.138 The neutrality of the state would also be at risk 
if the NSAs strengthened their existence by either acquiring 
armed support from factions within the neutral state, by gaining 
supplies of food or financial assistance from the neutral state, or 
by using the territory of the neutral state to transport weapons 
etc. In order to preserve its neutrality, the state would be 
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required to prevent the NSAs from taking control of its territory 
and from launching attacks against the victim state.139 
 On the other hand, if the neutral state is unwilling or 
unable to prevent the NSAs from launching attacks against the 
victim state from within its territory, then the state will no 
longer be regarded as neutral as its presence benefits the NSA 
and harms the victim state facing the terrorist attacks launched 
from the territory of the (so-called) neutral state.140 In such a 
situation, the unwilling or unable test becomes relevant and can 
be applied by the victim state to uphold its right of self-defense 
and to curb the bilateral, regional, and global threat from the 
NSA. 
 
C. Proposed Goals of the Test 
 
 Ashley Deeks suggested three goals of the unwilling or 
unable test.141 The first is to limit the use of force by the victim 
state so that it is used only as a last resort. This also implies 
that other peaceful options for cooperating with the host state 
must be tried by the victim state prior to settling on using force 
in the territory of the host state. The second goal is to clarify 
how force is to be used and the victim state’s plan of action so as 
to garner support from the international community for the 
justified means of use of force and to avert any allegation by the 
host state that the victim state used illegal weaponry, e.g., 
chemical weapons, as the means of force.142 
 The third and most important goal of the test is to 
establish a set of rules and criteria through which the victim 
state and the host state can decide on the use of force against 
the NSAs within the territory of the host state.143 This will pave 
the way toward acceptance of the unwilling or unable test as a 
standard for the use of force in an armed conflict. 
 
D. Application of the Test and the ISIS Crisis 
 
 As mentioned earlier, ISIS has posed a great threat to the 
United States, European countries, and neighboring Islamic 
countries in the Middle East. To the United States, it has given 
verbal threats that amount to a breach of the sovereignty and 
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safety of the United States. In response, the United States has 
to perform a preliminary action for its self-defense before too 
much time passes and ISIS becomes successful in its plans to 
launch attacks on the United States.144 However, because ISIS 
resides in Syrian territory and nearby lands, if the United 
States uses force against ISIS it will automatically enter Syrian 
territory. 
 Thus, according to the principles defined in the 
responsibilities of state mentioned above in Section 2, Syrian 
sovereignty has already been breached by ISIS, and in response 
the Syrian government has been unable or unwilling to take 
back the land captured by ISIS. Therefore, it has also not 
fulfilled its sovereign responsibilities as its neglect over ISIS 
presence in Syria and the Levant is strengthening ISIS, as 
explained in Section 2 of this paper. 
 Moreover, as illustrated above, the Syrian government 
has also been unable or unwilling to counter or mitigate the 
threat generated by ISIS or to protect its citizens from becoming 
victims of human rights violations by ISIS. Many Syrian people 
have been killed by ISIS, and young girls have been kidnapped 
by ISIS members.145 Thus, the Syrian state has been unable to 
fulfill its “responsibility to protect” its citizens,146 which implies 
that the responsibility now falls to the international community 
to protect the innocent civilians of Syria and of the bordering 
Levant region. In this situation, we will first apply the unwilling 
or unable test to justify the use of force by the United States 
against ISIS in Syrian territory. 
 The first step of the unwilling or unable test is to require 
consent from the host state,147 and here the United States has 
not asked for the consent of the host state, i.e., Syria. 148 
Recently, the Syrian government has expressed stern 
disapproval and has strictly opposed the use of force by the 
United States in Syrian territory.149 In 2014, statements from 
some Syrian ministers, including Foreign Minister Waleed Al-
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Moallem were interpreted by the United States as expressing 
tacit consent for the United States’ use of force against ISIS in 
Syrian territory,150 but the contemporary nature of hostility and 
censure expressed by the Syrian government over the use of 
force by the United States in Syrian territory has negated all 
previous, incorrect interpretations and has confirmed that there 
has been no consent granted by the Syrian government to the 
United States.151 This implies that the Syrian government is 
unwilling to collaborate with the United States over using force 
against ISIS NSAs in Syrian and Levant territory. This leads us 
to the second step of the unwilling or unable test. 
 The second step is to assess the ISIS threat and its 
contemporary implications, which the United States has 
evaluated to a great extent, inducing it to deploy its resources to 
launch a remote military operation against ISIS.152 However, 
scholars argue that the United States ignored the ISIS threat to 
a great extent in 2014–15, when ISIS took hold of the Levant 
region.153 Furthermore, the United States has not assessed the 
threat with precision, which is the reason behind the current 
persistent spread of the ISIS NSA organization.154 For instance, 
the United States’ estimates of the number of ISIS group 
members were seven times lower than they are at the present.155 
An accurate assessment of the threat is required in order to 
create an effective plan to counter and terminate the threat 
permanently. 
 The third step is to request that the host state counter the 
threat.156 The United States has already requested on numerous 
occasions that the Syrian government use force against ISIS, but 
somehow the Syrian government has been unable to use force 
effectively to terminate the threatening existence of ISIS in the 
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region.157 This leads to the fourth step of the unable or unwilling 
test, which is related to assessing the military capabilities of the 
Syrian state.158 The United States has estimated the difficult 
nature of countering the ISIS threat and therefore it has 
maintained that the Syrian government will not be able to deal 
with such a threat. Therefore, it has decided to use force against 
ISIS.159 
 The fifth step is to finalize the means to counter the ISIS 
threat.160 The United States is using air combat as a means to 
launch attacks on ISIS camps.161 However, the effectiveness of 
these air strikes is debatable as they have not resulted in ending 
the ISIS threat, probably because the strikes have not been 
robust so far.162 Ground-based military operations have not been 
launched by the United States Army so far owing to the complex 
nature of the ISIS threat. The United States has kept track of 
ISIS strongholds and has launched attacks by drone or jet 
fighter planes carrying missiles. It has also supported anti-ISIS 
groups, i.e., Kurdish militants and the coalition forces of 
European countries, militarily against ISIS.163 
 The sixth and final step of the unwilling or unable test is 
to evaluate the former interactions of the United States with the 
Syrian state. Unfortunately, the past interactions between the 
states, particularly during the presidency of Bashar Al-Assad 
and his family, have not been cordial. 164  Under the Assad 
regime, Syria has shown more political inclination toward 
Russia by becoming its ally alongside Iran and thus contributing 
toward a polarization in the Middle Eastern region that 
expresses an antagonistic posture toward the United States, 
particularly on the Syrian side.165 Furthermore, historically, the 
Syrian state was in the Soviet bloc against the United States 
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during the Cold War.166 Additionally, the Arab–Israeli conflicts 
after 1967 and during the 1970s provoked the hostility of Syria 
against Israel and its ardent supporter, the United States.167 
Such hostile past interactions discourage a collaboration 
between the states over the ISIS threat. 
 The aforementioned steps and their inferences imply that 
the unwilling or unable test fully applies to the armed conflict 
between ISIS and the United States. The United States can use 
force against ISIS in self-defense. However, it also needs to 
acquire consent from the Syrian government to use force against 
ISIS in Syrian territory168 according to the unwilling or unable 
test framework 169  and in order to legitimize its use of force 
according to the principles of international law related to an 
armed conflict.170 Curbing the ISIS threat is in the interest of 
not only the United States and European nations, but also the 
Syrian government, Iraq, and other Middle Eastern countries in 
ISIS’s neighborhood, because the ISIS has posed a horrendous 
threat to all of these regions.171 Furthermore, the United States 
should properly assess the ISIS threat in order to devise an 





 It is evident from history that the international 
community responds to a regional or international armed 
conflict in a multifaceted and unclear manner.172 That is, the 
international community criticizes the use of force by one state 
in the territory of another. Such force is an apparent breach of 
territorial sovereignty of the host state when the military 
actions by the victim state are launched against NSAs in the 
territory of the host state and when the host state has not given 
express and open consent to the victim state to use force in its 
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territory.173 This weakens support for the stance of the victim 
state. As a result, its right of self-defense would appear to be at 
stake, despite this right having been recognized by Article 51 of 
the United Nations Charter. 
 Furthermore, it is pertinent to mention here that modern 
technology can also help NSAs to grow stronger174 because it can 
assist NSAs to act in a more organized manner; for instance, 
using fast communication tools,175  the Internet, sophisticated 
weaponry, location trackers, and other technological tools176 can 
help them strategically to hold their presence for a longer time. 
 NSAs that are more advanced in military capacity as well 
as in organization can capture natural resources and can use 
them for financial support. For instance, ISIS has captured the 
oil wells near the Iraq and Syrian borders177 and has allegedly 
been found to be earning around a million dollars a day from 
exporting oil to some countries.178 The seizure of such resources 
can make NSAs, like ISIS, grow stronger and states, like Syria, 
grow relatively weaker when their territory is captured by 
NSAs; therefore, the nature of the ISIS threat is getting 
stronger. Consequently, in a situation where NSAs are growing 
stronger and are generating threats to states globally, but the 
international community remains undecided about approving 
the use of force against them, there can arise the possibility of 
victim states indulging in proxy wars in host states.179 
 As it is the inherent right of the victim state to use force 
in its self-defense,180 the victim state may choose to act either by 
launching a direct attack against NSAs within the territory of a 
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host state or by punishing them through another NSA group 
that may not be officially identified as having associations with 
the victim state. In either case, the victim state would be using 
force to exercise its inherent right of self-defense. However, such 
a situation would cause severe damage to the peace and stability 
of the region, particularly in a situation when the victim state 
chooses to act surreptitiously by supporting a NSA group to fight 
against another NSA group threatening the security of the 
victim state from within the host state’s territory. Moreover, it 
may also lead to severe human rights violations in which local 
civilians might also face significant harm, because NSAs do not 
follow any obligations of international law, despite the fact that 
the UN Charter and customary international law applies to 
them. 181  Furthermore, any of the two fighting NSAs may 
attempt to create a state of its own in the territory captured and 
controlled by it.182 
 Thus, the main concern is that a divorce between 
international law and contemporary reality is harmful and 
becomes imminent in the aforementioned armed conflict, which 
can convince the victim states to use subversive means to 
respond in order to preserve their self-defense. These concerns 
are compelling because international law does not provide 
guidance particularly in the event of an armed conflict between 
a state and an NSA residing in another sovereign state; 
furthermore, there are no particular laws but only inferences 
from the principles of international law that can suggest or 
endorse possible reactions for preserving victim states’ right of 
self-defense. Such a situation can impel victim states to behave 
outside their legal obligations when they do not find any part of 
international law favoring their self-defense stance. Hence, 
ignoring the problems such as armed conflict between a state 
and an NSA in another state can cause ambiguousness in 
international law and, at times, can lead to its disregard by the 
international community, which may choose to act outside the 
law to safeguard their self-defense or to protect their interests. 
 There is an urgent need for international law to evolve in 
a manner that would provide effective and pragmatic 
regulations covering all kinds of conflicts and issues, whether 
between states or between a state and an NSA. Furthermore, 
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international armed conflicts should be regulated in relation to 
addressing the sovereignty of the states involved in the conflict. 
Finally, international law also needs to provide effective and 
pragmatic recommendations for dealing with weak or failed 
states in such a manner that protects their sovereignty, 
particularly for those states that are directly or indirectly 
involved in an armed conflict. Such guidelines, if provided, 
would result in protecting the sovereignty of states from 
infringement by NSAs like ISIS. 
 
